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" It is not necessary that it should have been actually used
ftr the purpo~es contemplated, but it must have been capable
of such use." p. 15. And in the Union Sugar Refinery v.
Jfattheson, 2 Fish. 600, it was held that the prior invention
must have been "reduced to practice in the form of an
operative machine."
It cannot be necessary to refer to any other cases on this
point, since the law thus defined has never been questioned
ii any legal tribunal. The utmost extent to which our courts
filve gone in contravention of it was in Watson v. Bladen,
4 Wash. 580, in which it was shown that a machine constructed on the same principle as that described in the plaintiff's patent bad been made and put in operation several years
before he originated it. It had been worked by hand only,
and proving not to be profitable, was relinquished. The
plaintiff's machine was open to the same objection, and it was
successful only because it was operated by power. It was
urged on his part that the former machine was only experimental. While this was admitted by Judge WASHNGTON,
who presided at the trial, he held, nevertheless, that it was
.sufficient to destroy the plaintiff's claim as an inventor. It
s evident that the machine was experimental, after all, only
in a secondary sense, and in a financial View. As a machine
it was perfect, and capable of use for i business, and comes
within the rule which has been advanced. The case of Grey
vi James, 1 Pet. 0.0. 394 and 476, may: be thought to resemble that of Watson v. Bladen, but it is equally in accordance
with the principle. It may be safely laid down, therefore, as
the doctrine of the law, than an invention can be said to be
reduced to practice only when it has been embodied, if
susceptible of it, in a machine capable of being used for practical purposes, as distinguished from one that is merely experimental. If not susceptible of being so embodied, some
step equivalent to that must have been taken with it.
[To be continued.]

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
LOYAL C. KELLOGG v. JOHN A. PAGE, STATE TREASURER.
The judgment of the National court of last resort, in May, 1871, that all debts,
whether created before or after the passage of the "1Legal Tender Act," were
payable in the paper issues authorized by Congress,'determined and 1axed
the rule of legal duty.
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Laws out horizing public ofacers, or trustees nndbr a charter, to do an act, are
to be construed like other statutes, according to the intent of the legislature in
enacting thein, to determine whether they are perniusive or imperative.
The construction of the joint resolution passed in 1870 by the Senate and
Hous of Representatives, authorizing the State Treasurer to pay in coin certain State bonds issued before the passage of the "Legal Tender Act," is to be
interpreted, not by evidence aliunde, but by the language used, the circumstances existing at the time, and the exigencies that called for its adoption.
And It is held that the legislature intended thereby to enable the treasurer to
conforin to the law as then interpreted by the courts, as to the kind of money
with which to pay said bonds, and so long as that interpretation prevailed,
and

no more.

The bonds in question Were due June 1st, 1871, and payment was soon thereafter demaudEd "in coin." Hed, that the relator then had no claim de jure to
require payment in coin, under the then interpretation of the "Legal Tender
Act" by the Supreme Court of the Vnited States.
Where authority is given to exercise a power beneficial to a citizen, and thd
right to the power exercised continues and subsists, courts hold that the duty
to exercise that power is ab.olute, and will make it imperativ. But this is not
a case where courts have ever construed words permissive to be fmperatve.
There would seem to be no ground for claiming that this joint resolution,
not having had the approval of the Governor, has the character of alegal enactment.

PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, addressed to the Supreme Court;
Washington county, August term, 1871. The respondent
filed an answer to the petition, to which the relatoi replied.
The facts alleged in the pleadings are sufficiently stated ii
the opinion of the court.
Loyal a. Kellogg, ypro se.
W. G. Ferin and Heaton & ReedA for the respondent:

The opinion of the court was delivered by
REDFIELD,

J.-This is a petition for mandamus.

The re :

lator avers, in his petition, that on the 22d day of November,
1870, he was and ever Since has been the lawful holder and
bearer of four bonds of the State, legally authorized and
executed, amounting in the whole to the ium of three thousand dollars, with interest, and issued befoi e the passage of
the "Legal Tender Act," so-called, which was enacted by the
Congress of the United States, and approved February 25th,
1862; and became payable in'the year 1871. That at the
October session of the legislature of this State, A. D. 1870,
a joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives*

KELLOGG V. PAGE.

was passed, entitled "joint resolution relating to paying in
coin certain debts of the State of Vermont," wherein it was
resolved "that the treasurer of the State be authorized to
pay, in coin, the bonds which shall become due in 1871, and
the interest thereon, which were issued before the passage
of the 'Legal Tender Act' of the Congress of the United
States; and to carry into effect the provisions of this resolu-"
tion, the treasurer is authorized to purchase gold coin in such
quantity as shall be necessary for the purpose aforesaid.'
That he demanded the coin, in -payment of such bonds, at the
proper time and place, and was refused; the treasuier offering
to pay the same in treasury notes, commonly called greenbacks. That on the first day of June, 1871, when said bonds
became due, and when the coin was demanded, the treasurer
had in his hands coin, provided by him, under the
authority of said joint resolution, sufficient to pay said bonds,
and all other bonds of the State falling due at that time;
and that the treasurer had paid all the semi-annual interest
becoming due on that class of bonds, after the passage of said
joint resolution, on the first days of June and December, respedtively, A. D. 1870, including the four bonds held by the
relator.
The respondent in his answer admits that the relator was
the legal holder of said four bonds; that they were legally
issued, and became due and payable as stated in the petition;
and that payment in coin was demanded and refused. The
respondent justifies his refusal to pay said bonds in coin upon
two grounds:
First. That said bonds were solvable in legal tender notes.
And that, at the time said joint resolution was passed, the
Supreme Court of the United States, at the city of Washington, had decided in the case of Hepburn v. Griswold,8 Wall.
603, that contracts entered into before the passage of the
"legal tender act," must be solved in coin. That said decision
was made by a divided court. That other cases, involving
the same legal question, were on the calendar awaiting the
decision of the same court; and it was then doubtful whether
the decision of the court in Hepburn v. Griswold would stand
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and remain the law of the land, or be reversed. And that
said joint resolution was purposely drawn, and designed to
give the treasurer discretionary power and ability to
pay this class of bonds in coin, if the law should continue
to require it, and not otherwise. That in May, 1871, the
Supreme Court of the United States, at the city of Washington, in the cases of Knox v. Lee, and Parkerv. Davis, reversed
the rule of law as-held in, Hepburn v. Griswold, and decided
that the "legal tender act" of February 25th, 1862, did apply
to and control contracts made previous, as well as subsequent
to its passage; whereby it became the law of the land that
said bonds held by the relator were ever payable in the paper
currency authorized by said act of congress. And therefore
the respondent refused to pay said bonds, and the interest
thereon, in gold coin, and insists that in doing so he obeyed
the will of the legislature, as expressed in said joint resolution.

Second. The respondent insists that said joint resolutioh
was never approved by the governor, nor ever presented to
him for approval, and for this reason it has not t6he force of
a legal enactment; and imposes no absolute duty- upon the
respondent.
The relator insists, in argument, that "both justice and
the public interests concur in requiring the payment of a
debt in a currency equivalent to, or -not depreciated below
that in which it originated," and that the legislature, in
"authorizing" the treasurer to pay this debt in coin-the
same currency in which it originated-recognized that duty.
The very able argument of the learned relator, in the
forum of conscience, ought to be satisfactory to any mind.
And very good reasons, as I think, could be given that no
other than gold and silver, under the Constitution, was intended to be the legal currency of the government. The
relation of debtor and creditor; of capital and labor; the
growth and stability of commerce; in short, the whole material fabric of the State is so -interwoven with, and dependent upon, a staple and unfluctuating currency, that no considerate mind doubts its importance and necessity.
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But it is the high prerogative of the Supreme Court of the
United States to determine the limitations of the laws of
congress, and declare their harmony, or conflict, with the
Constitution. The subordiniation and respectful deference of
all other courts within the national jurisdiction, to the adjudication of these questions in that court is a duty; because
such adjudication is the law of the land. The judgment of
the national court of last resort, in May, 1871, that all debts,
whether created before or after the passage of the "legal
tender act," were payable in the paper issues authorized by
congress, determined and fixed the rule of legal duty. And
whether loans in gold coin should be solvable in the like, or
in depreciated paper, was thereafter to be determined at the
forum of conscience.
The relator further insists that the language of the joint
resolution, though permissive in form, is imperative in law.
The cases are numerous where courts of the highest
authority have held that laws authorizing a public officer, or
trustees under a charter, to do an act, imposes upon them an
imperative duty. In many other cases of like authority the
courts have held that the same or similar language is not imperative, but conveys a mere discretionary power. It is said
in some cases that "may" means must. But the law has
made no new lexicon in this class of cases to give exceptional
meaning to words. Like all other statutes, the intent and
purpose of the legislature is the true guide and criterion of
construction. Mr. Smith, in his work on Statute and Constitutional Law and Construction, p. 724, has very clearly
stated the rule. "It is the general rule in the construction
of statutes that the word "may" in a public statute is to be
construed "must" in all cases where the legislature means to
impose a positive and absolute duty, and not merely to give a
discretionary power; but no general rule can be laid down
upon this subject, further than that exposition ought to be
adopted in this as in other cases, which will carry into effect
the true intent and object of the legislature in the enactment."
If the case at bar is to be determined by this rule, we think
its solution is easy. Up to the time of the promulgation of
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the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, in
Hepburn v. Griswold, the treasurer had been paying principal
and interest of the State bonds in the paper currency provided by congress. At the'session of the legislature next after
that decision in October, 1870, the governor in his annual
message called the special attention of the legislature to that
decision, and urged that provision be made to pay the debt
of the State in accordance with the requirements of law, that
no taint might attach to the good faith and credit of the State.
If we consider the evidence aliunde, the mode afid manner in
which the joint resolution was drawn, modified, and shaped
in committee, and the avowed reasons for the form ultimately given it, there can be no doubt that the legislature i7itended merely to authorize the treasurer in his discretion to
pay this class of debts in coin. But we think the joint resolution must be interpreted by the language used, the circumstances existing at the time, and the*exigencies that called
for its adoption. The assumption that the legislature was
seized with a sudden repentance and remorse for having paid
the creditors of the State in a depreciated currency, and, ba
virtuous chagrin, resolved thereafter to pay in gold, is assuming for it an abnormal condition, and would require
positive evidence to establish it. The highest courts in fifteep
.of the States, including our own, had then decided
that al
debts could be lawfully paid in this paper issue; and the
public conviction that the "legal tender act" had an important
agency in crushing, an odious rebellion was so deep, that
whoever questioned the moral or legal propriety of paying
debts in greenbacks, was deemed oblique in morals, -perverted in judgment, and wanting in patriotism. It was the
unexpected decision in Hepburn v. Griswold that constrained
the action of the legislature. And the public agitation
resulting from that judgment, and the agencies at work to
change or modify that decision, with which all.but moderately
acquainted with public affairs were familiar, induced that
body to shape the resolution in this discretionary form. The
legislature intended to enable the treasurer to conform to the
law as interpreted by the courts, and so long as that interpratationprevailed, and no more.
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II. At the time the demand was made the relator had no
claim, de jure, to require payment of his bonds in gold.
The rule is well stated by Chancellor KENT, in the Newburg Turnpike Co. v. Miller, 5 J. C. R. 112, "that the word
'may' means must, or shall, only in cases where the public
interest and rights are concerned; and where the public or
third persons have a claim, de jure, that the power should be
exercised."
'Had the relator, on the first day of June, 1871, a claim, de
jure, that the bonds should be paid in gold?
The Supreme Court of the United States had then solemnly
declared that the "legal tender act" was in no degree restrained or limited by the constitution. And, therefore, these
bonds could be lawfully paid in paper money, and a tender of
the sum due in greenbacks would have canceled the bonds.
This is not, then, a case where courts have ever construed
words _permissive to be imperative. Indeed, "may" never
means must in law, any more than in philosophy. But when
authority is given to exercise a power beneficial to a citizen,
and the right to have that power exercised continues and subsists, courts hold that the duty to exercise that power is abso.
lute, and will make it imperative, for such is deemed the intent of the legislature. The right and the duty are correlative.
IM.It is claimed that the joint resolution of the senate
and house of representatives, without the approval of the
governor, imposes no legal duty upon the treasurer. This
resolution purports to authorize the treasurer to draw money
from the treasury. The 17th see., part 2d of the constitution of this State, declares that "no money shall be drawn
out of the treasury unless first appropriated by act of legisla.
tion." The 11th sec. of the articles of amendment declares
that "every bill which shall have passed the senate and
house of representatives shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the governor," etc. There would seem no
ground for claiming that this joint resolution of the two
houses has the character of a legal enactment. The governor, under the constitution of this State, is a co-ordinate
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branch of the government, and a necessary party to all "acts
of lgislation." But the court have not considered, and do
not decide whether, if the petition was otherwise well
founded, relief might not be given.
The writ of mandamus is refused; the petition is dismissed, but without costs.
The rule of construction of statutes officersare commonlymore specifically
by which "may" is made to read shal, defined. And it is a familiar principle
is based upon the rule that, where the of the law that arbitrary discretion is
statute enacts thata thing iay be done never reposed in any publi6 officer. It
by any particular officer or person is only a legal discretion which is ever
named, and the thing to be done is in intended to be reposed in any public
favorofjustice or the publicgood, then officer. There are very many imporsuch officer or person is Imperatively taut functions pertaining to judicial
boundtodotheact. "For example, the administration which must depend
23 Hen. VL says the sheriff may take very largely upon the discretion of the
bail; that is construed he shall, for he judge. But this, as has been often said,
Is compellable to do so." Carth. 293; imports the judgment of the magisSalk. 609; Skinn. 370; Bouvier Law Dic- trate upon the circumstances of thle
tionary, Tit. May. So that where it particular case, when viewed in the
was enacted that "the Lord Chancellor light of judicial precedent.
'may' grant a commission of bank- The principal ease is one entirely
ruptcy," it.was construed he must do different from any of the precedents
so, and the Lord Keeper said "it had where "may" hasbeen allowed to have
been so resolved byall thejodges." A- the force of must or shall.' Here is no
derman Blackwell'& Case, 1 Vernon 152. power created for any public purpose,
&und in Allorpey General v. Cook, aAtk. but only a private discretion given by
168, it Is said, "shall and nay, in acts a debtor in the only mode in which It
of parliament or id private constitu- could be given, to its financial agent,
tions, are to be construed imperative- In regard to the mode of their meeting
ly." This was where the governor of a its liability-that is, to pay them in such
hospital bad power, by the words currency as the decisions of the oily
"shall and may," to remove the pen- tribunal having final Jurisdiction of
sioners of the hospital for being guilty the SLuestion should hold obligatory.
of "drunkenness or any debauchery," The resolution was, in fact, nothing
and the Lord Chancellor, ona petition more thanamentalresolveofanatural
to restore them, said the governor had person, being a debtor, on, at mopt, a
consultation with his paying
no discretion in the matter. The rule private
clerk. It was in no sense a promise or
may be regarded as nearly universal, undertaking toward the creditor, cal.
probably, to construe "'may"as equivo- culated orintended to modify the origicated to "1shall have power to," in en- nal security; and if it bad been so
abling statutes, since it is presumable made and intended it would be of no
that the legislature would notprobably validity, not being kpon any sufficient
t consideration. So that in every view
enact a power unless it had intended to be taken of the case the decision
its exercise whenever the occasion for seems to be most unquestionable. If
its creation should occur; nor would it the treasurer had refused to pay at all,
be supposed that a statute intended to having the money for thatpurpose; or
if he had refused to pay
to
confer a merely discretionary power existing decision of the according
National Su
would, ordinarily, leave it to depend premeCourt, theremedy of mandamus
upon the force of the auxiliary verb. would probably have been available.
1. F. R.
Discretionary powers reposed in public
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Supreme Court of Kansas.
DAVID H. MITCHELL V. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
OF LEAVENWORTH COUNTY et al.
When a party has a general deposit of current funds in a bank, and on the
2Sth day of February gives a check for such funds payable in legal' tender
notcs, and notes of that character are handed to him, and he makes a special
deposit of such notes in the same bank, and three days afterward changes his
special deposit of legal tender notes into a general deposit of current funds,
and where the whole transaction is for the sole and express purpose of escaping taxation on such deposit: Held, That as to tegovernment, the transaction
was void, and the actor not entitled to the intervention of the courts to be relieved from the taxes imposed on such deposits.

This was a bill to restrain the defendants from the collection of certain personal taxes outstanding on the tax roll of
fhe county.
In June, 1870, plaintiff, who was a citizen and resident of
Leavenworth county, made out and returned to the county
clerk a statement of his personal property, money and effects
liable to taxation.
On February 28th, 1870, plaintiff had on deposit in the
banking house of Scott & Co., in Leavenworth, the sum of
$19,350 in current funds belonging to himself, and on that
day he gave said house a check for his entire deposits, payable to himself, in United States legal tender treasury notes,
commonly called greenbacks, and the plaintiff then received
said amount in said legal tender notes, and inclosed them in
a sealed envelope and immediately returned them thus
sealed up to the bank, and afterward, on the 3d day of
March, 1870, the plaintiff deposited all of said money with
said bank, as a general and ordinary deposit of current funds.
No part of said sum was included in the statement returned as aforesaid to the county clerk.
The funds thus on deposit by the plaintiff were drawn
out of the bank as aforesaid, and left on special deposit, and
re-deposited as aforesaid by the plaintiff for the sole and express purpose of escaping taxation on the funds so belonging
to him, for the year 1870.
Subsequently, on October 22d, 1870, an examination was
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had of the plaintiff and other persons, and on the -ascertainment oI the foregoing facts the assessment against the plaintiff was raised. It was to enjoin the collection of the tax on
this part of the assessment that plaintiff filed this bill. The
District Court on bill and answet dissolved the preliminary
injunction and dismissed the bill.
Pender and Goddard for plaintiff.
F. P. Fitzwilliam for defendants.
The principle of equality and justice requires that each
person should contribute toward the public expenses his pro.
portional share, according to the advantages which he receives,
as it lies at the foundation of our political existence. KnowZ:
ton v. S Tpervisors, 9 Wis. 418. Case of the Mayor of Yew
o
Y,.'k, 11 Johns. 80.
The attempt of plaintiff to change his banking accouit
into a special deposit of legal tender notes was a trick, "and
,void as against public policy. Wheeler v. Russel, 17 Mass.
258; Broom's Legal Max. (6 Am. ed.) 540.
'That United States legal tender notes are exempt from
-taxation is conceded to be the law of !he land. The tax,
about which complaint is made, was 'not a tax assessed on
property exempt under the laws of the United States. It
was a tax assessed under the laws of the State on certain
faxable property belonging to plaintiff, which, in view of the
law, had not changed its character. He attempted to evade
-the statutes of the State, and thereby escape taxation.
Courts will not construe a statute so as to suffer it to be
evaded. _People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 882; Broom's
Leg. Max. 423. And a fraud upon, or evasion of a statute,
will not be tolerated in a court of justice. ,Strattonv. Herrick, 9 Johns. 356; Stratton v. Huble, 9 Johns. 857; Jackson
v. Burgott, 10 Johns. 461;- Bates v. Sutherland, 15 Johns.
510.; Hearsy v. Boyd, 7 John-. 184. A fraudrupon a statute
is a violation of the statute. Bank of U. S. v. Owens et al.,
2 Pet. 536. Laws exempting property from takation are to
be strictly construed, and are to be restricted in their applica.
tion .to the subject matter in hand. Cincinnati College v.
State, 19 Ohio 110; 8 Sandf., S. C. 409 ; 37 N. Y. 9, 21.
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The pre-existing right of the State to require the 'plaintiff
to bear his share of the public expenses, cannot be defeated
by the effort of plaintiff to create a new right to the prejudice
of the old one, for there is no legal principle to justify such
a proceeding. Broom's Legal Maxims 282 (6 Am. ed.). Rex
v. Wead,31 E. C. L. R. 384 ; 15 Johns. 281 ; 17 Johns. 100.
Plaintiff had a duty to discharge to his State for the protection and security afforded to him and his property. This
was a restraint on his right to evade the law, and where
rights pertaining to the State and the individual clash, the
individual rights must yield to that of the State. As between
individuals the law will not permit a debtor to dispose of his
property so as to defraud his creditors; much less will a
a debtor to the State be permitted to defeat the State from
collecting the means to support and carry on the State government by practicing fraud on its laws. Therefore, upon
the same principle, the property never, changed its character
toward the State, so as to become exempt from taxation.
If a person disposes of his property so as to reduce it
within the amount allowed under the exemption laws of the
State, and this is done for the purpose of defeating his creditors, the law will not protect him. The courts are no longer
open to him. Bracket v. Watkins, 21 Wend. 68 ; Hanlon v.
Burton, 1 Cart. (Ind.) 39; Ryan v. Wbicter, 6 Allen 292.
Even when the statute contains no express prohibition of
such an attempt to evade it, it was an illegal and void act,
being an attempt to contravene the policy of the public statute,
and injurious to the State. 4 Hals. 352; 5 Hals. 87; 4
Peters 184; Chity Cont. 677 (9 Am. ed.). "To state such a
case is to decide it. Public morals, public justice, and the
well established principles of all judicial tribunals alike forbid the interposition of courts of justice to lend their aid to
purposes like this." Bartel v. Colemann, 4 Peters 187.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KING1A T!,C. J.-On the 28th February, 1870, the plaintiff in
error had a large amount of money in current funds on deposit
with Scott & Co., bankers of Leavenworth. On that day he
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gave the bank a check payable to himself in legal tender treasury notes. He received the legal tender notes, enclosed them
in a sealed envelope and immediately returned them thus
sealed up to the bank; and. three days afterward deposited
all of said money as a general and ordinary deposit of current funds. The whole transaction was for the sole and express purpose of escaping taxation on the funds so used for
the year 1870. Did he, bythis transaction, so place his property as to relieve it from the burthens of taxation, and is he
in a situation in which he can invoke the aid of a court to
restrain the taxes levied upon those funds.
It is conceded that United States legal tender notes are exempt from taxation. It is also conceded that the transaction
between plaintiff in error and the bankers is one, not in con.
trAvention of law of itself, but it is contended that the motive
being to defraud the Government of its just dues and enable
the plaintiff to escape the just burthens that society imposes
on him enters into and vitiates the whole transaction, and
that a court of jtstice sitting as a court of equity will not
lend its aid for the accomplishinent of any such *purpose.
And we think the argument a good one.'
Reference is made to the principles stated in the brief of
defendant in error and the authorities cited to sustain them.
The judgment is affirmed.
United States Circuit Court, Western District of Tennessee.
THE CITY OF MEMPHIS V. T. E. BROWN.
When contracts have been made, acts done, andlaborperformedinpursuane6
of a construction of a city charter, acquiesced in by all its citizens, such construction will be sustained ifJustiled by any possible reading of the statute&
In reference to all acts which a Municipal Corporation has power in any mode,
and by any agency, to perform, it may bind itself by those agents whom it
suffZs to act for it, and in the modes which it sanctions by its own usages, unless such modes and agencies are prollibited by the charter.
Where the charter prescribes votes of shareholders, citizens, or directors, or
other formalities as conditions precedent to the performance of acts, aud such
acts are performed without such formalities, third persons acting in good
faith may presume all has been done which the charter demanded, and the corporation will not be suffered to prove its own negligence or willful derelictioe
to defraud innocent parties of their labor, property or money.
A municipal, like a private corporation, may in the ordinary course of Its government, and in the conduct of improvements it is its duty to execute, make
promissory notes, bonds, guarantees, and all other agreements necessary or
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convenient for the economical and proper financial management of its affairs
as fully as a natural person.
The mayor, city attorney and treasurer of the corporation having ordinarily been suffered to make similar agreements, may engage attorneys to collect
demands due the municipality, when its interests demand such service.
If the service is in a suit in which the city is a party, or in which it is intetested, and is performed with the kitowledge of the officials, the city is liable
for the services in the same manner as a natunl person. Judgments holding
the contrary depend upon statutes which expressly prohibit such retainers.
A guaranty of payment imposes an obligation to pay at the maturity of the
security, and the holder need not wait for the result of a suit against the principal debtor, but nay demand the money from the guarantor immediately upon
the dishonor of the paper.
The payment of a less sum is not a sufficient consideration for an agreement
to discharge a greater, but the Code of Tennessee alters the common law rule,
and enforces such contracts when iully performed in good faith according to
the intention of the parties.
When an agreement is made by a debtor to deliver in full satisfaction of a
larger sum due, his notes or money for a less sum, even though there is a con.
sideration for the agreement, it must, in order to operate as a dischurge, be
fully and fairly performed in all its parts, both in time and amount.
In order to sustain a contract of settlement without other sufficient con.
sideration, upon the ground that It was the compromise of doubtful claims, the
doubt must be such as would arise in the mind of an ordinarily intelligent per.
son familiar with the class of things which is the subject of the settlement.
The measure of damages for the non-payment of iMoney, or the non-delivery
of a debtor's obligations for money, is the amount due and interest, and as an
almost universal rule, no collateral damages can be given.
If negotiable bonds, of a class which, by the usages of trade, are vendable in
market at established rates, are to be issued iii payment, accompanied with a
sinking fund to give them greater market value, such bonds are to be treated
as if they were chattels and things in esse, and the damag.s for failure to provide the fund will be the difference between the value of the bonds as they were
agreed to be made, and the value as they were in fact made.

Suit at law was originally brought by Brown & Co. in this
court for paving; subsequently the city filed its bill in equity
against Brown & Co. in the State court, on the same contracts,
to restrain certain collections by Brown & Co., and for an accounting. This suit the defendants removed to this court, and
by consent of parties the subject of the action at law was by crosshill united with this suit.
The action is based upon two contracts made by the city with
the assignors of Brown & Co., for street paving. Under the first,
paving at the intersections of streets and alleys and opposite public ground, was to be paid for in cash by the city, and that opposite lots of private owners, by such owners, on bills to be made
out by the city engineer, one-half when each section of 400 feet
was done, and the other half, in instalments, due in thirty, sixty
and ninety days, the payment of which the city guaranteed.
Under the second contract, the whole work was payable by the
city, as each such section was done, in 6 per cent. coupon city
bonds, running five, ten and fifteen years, guaranteed by a sinking
fund.
Bonds were delivered for the work done, and were sold by tile
contractors to prosecute the work; but the city established no
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fund for their payment, nor paid the interest on them, and the
bonds sold at the price of other unsecured city bonds, which was
less than a sinking fund bond would have brought, and such
difference the contractors claimed.
After some work had been done, this second contract was modified so as to make the work opposite private lots payable in cash
as under the first.
. After most of the work was done, when over half a million dollars were due, the city agreed to loan Brown & Co., first $100,000, and afterward $1'15,000 of its bonds, upon an agreement to
secure them by pledges, and to return them with interest in
eighteen months, and also to release the city from all liability on
the contracts unless it should be determined by the court of last
resort that the lot owners were not liable. Some forty thousand
dollars of the bonds under this loan agreement were not delivered.
By the contracts the city was to collect the bills for paving.
from the lot owners, but that was mainly done by Brown & Co.,
at the request of the mayor and city attorney. Brown & Co.
claimed compensation for such services, and also the reimbursement
of moneys paid out by them to attorneys, for enforcing other like
collections.
The learned judge, after deciding that the city had power to
make the contracts, proceeded, on the question of the manner of its'
exercise, as follows:
Em,oNs, J.-A distinct consideration 'cannot lbe given to the
manifold objections made by the counsel for the city in reference
to the power of the mayor, the treasurer, the city attorney and
other officials to perform various acts during the progress of this
work. That the mayor and other officers could not make the
agreements to take the bonds below par, that they could not
under the contract order the work suspended, could not authorize
the retention of counsel to aid the city attorney in duties for the
benefit of the corporation without a vote of the council, and va.
rious similar objections were elaborately urged.
Deeming every one of them to refer to powers which the city
had in some form and some mode fall right to exercise, and beiiig
referred 'to no express statutory prohibition, forbidding the performance in the manner which is shown to be usual in its administration of this whole class of duties, we consider them all answered
by the familiar doctrine that corporations, like individuals, are
bound by acts of those whom they have suffered to act as their
agents, and by such modes of action, with or without vote, as they
have by common usage sanctioned as proper. We repeat, after
after careful reconsideration, the doctrines in thie regard contained in Bay v. Nashville, in the Middle District of Tennessee,
1871.
We had in that case the benefit -of a most careful and learned
argument. The securities of the city had been, in violation of its
ordinances, put upon the market much below their par value. The
court, after explaining to thd jury the distinction between acts
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and contracts which were not authorized at all by the charter,
and those which were so authorized but required the performance
of official acts in order to render them regular, said that the
latter, even though made or performed without the formalities
demanded by the statute, bound the corporation as to all parties
not having actual notice of the irregularity. That this principle
was applicable alike to negotiable and non-negotiable securities
to municipal as well as to private corporations. Among other
charges, the following was given:
"It is in evidence that by usage such instruments have been
signed and issued by the officers who issued these. If you credit
this evidence, it is sufficient to authorize you to find that the
mayor, recorder and treasurer were agents of the corporation for
this purpose, and competent to bind it by these instruments. A
corporation, unless restricted as to manner by its charter, may, by
holding out to the public, officers as clothed with certain powers,
be bound by their acts within the scope of the functions so usually
exei cised."
This, it was said, was at least the law of the national courts,
and most clearly that,,f Tennessee. In the same case we excluded
offered evidence of irregularities in the issue of the securities sued
on. The court in that case relied on the following Federal judgments: Commissioners of Knox county v. Aspinwall, 21 Howard 539; Zabriskie v. Cleoeland B. B. Co., 23 How. 381; Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 289; Rogers v. Burlington, 3
Wallace 634; Vanhastrop v. Madison,' 1 Wall. 221; Mercer
Co. v. Hackett, 1 Wall. 83; Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall.
383; Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wallace 772; Mann v. Miami
Co., 2 Black 722; B. B. Co., v Howard, 7 Wall. 413; Mayor,
etc., v. Lord, 9 Wallace 414. A great number of State adjudications were also cited and discussed by counsel in the case, which
it is unnecessary to cite here in view of the pointed character of
the national and local State judgments in Tennessee. A small
number from the extensive list are referred to, only to illustrate
the principle we consider firmly embodied in the American Common Law. It is not peculiar to the Federal courts or those of
Tennessee. The citations of course might be greatly multiplied.
They are collected by Messrs. Angell & Ames, by Mr. Redfield
and other writers upon this subject, to the propositions they deem
long settled, and no longer questionable. Hermann on Estoppel,
512: "Corporations are bound by estoppel in pais like natural
persons." Trustees v. Mayor, etc., Aberdeen, 13 S. & M. 647,
5 Wallace, 772. Tie court says (p. 782)!: "Excess of power may
be ratified by express act or implicdly by assent, by acts and conduct inconsistent with any other hypothesis."
U. S. Bank v. Danbridqe,12 Wheat. 710. Where the law required the bond of the cashier to be approved by the Board of
Directors, it was said practical adoption by action which presumed
it, was sufficient. Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 469. The
city officers had lighted the city buildings with gas without any
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contract of the common council. The gas company sued for the
value of the gas so consumed during several years. FiELD, J.,
says: "The city is bound by its acts and conduct as an individual or private corporation. It is impliedly bound and liable
whenever justice demands it to be."
Peterson v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 17 N. Y. 453. The
suit was for plans for market made at the request of a committee;
although the contract of employment was void, the city was held
liable on a ratification by the use of the plans. The court,
by DE 1o, J., says: "This ratification may be by acts or
conduct inconsistent with 'any other supposition than that it
Quointended to own and adopt the acts done in its name."
ting KENT, J., he adds: "The doctrine that corporations can be
bound by implied contracts to be deduced from corporate acts
without either a deed in writing or vote, is generally established
in this country with great clearness and solidity of argumentl
and quotes many cases. See also Meyers v. City of Muscatine,
1 Wall. 393; Gelpke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; All.
ghany City v. Me Clurken, 14 Pa. St. 83; Dougherty v. Hunter,
54 Penn. St. 381.
In Ardisco Oil Co. v. Gibson, 63 Penn. St. 150, a suit for
damages from the explosion of an oil refiner, built under the direction of the president of the company, with6ut any special authority from the company, the court says: "It is their officers
having charge of their business, who, for all practical purposes,
must be regarded as the corporation itself. The same rule of liability must be applied to them as to natural persons." . See also
-Bankv. Gilstrup, 45 Mlo. 419. That where there is power in
reference to the subject generally, the city may make all the contracts and do all the acts an individual may do ; see also Corwit&
'v. City of Galena, 48 Ill. 423; People v. City of Cairo, 50 Ill.
154; Blunt v. Walker, 11 Wis. 349; De Voss v. City of Bichmond, 7 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 559; Gas Co. v. City of San
Francisco, 9 Cal. 469; Trustees, etc., v. Mayor of Aberdeen,
13 S. & M. 647 ; 5 N. Y. (1 Seld.) 314 ; 12 Wheat. 61. * *
*
*
Adams v. the City of Memphis, 2 Coldwell 645,
puts at rest all the objections in this case in reference to the want
of authority to guarantee, to issue bonds generally, to agree to
pay counsel for the collection of paving bills, to sell bonds below
par, and all other subordinate acts in this case, germane to, and
proper for, the execution of the main duty of contracting and paying for the paving of its streets. In that case the city guaranteed
the bonds of the Little Rock R. R. Co., and to secure them
mortgaged a tract of land donated to it by the United States. The
charter contained no special provision authorizing this action. The
Supreme Court of Tennessee deduced the right to makb the mortgage and the instrument of guaranty solely from the general imlied power of the corporation. On page 660 they quote 21 How.
424, including its citations of State judgments as follows: "It is
well settled that a corporation in the course of its ordinary busiVoL. XX.--a
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ness may make bonds, notes, mortgages and drafts, except when
restrained by law. 25 Barb. 146; 1 Sand. Ch. 280; 14 Barbour
358; 5 Watts & S. 223;-4 Robb 51; 4 B. MIon. 423; 6 Gill &
J. 323; 32 N. H. 486."
The citation of this clause, including these judgments, and the
comments accompanying them, render it clear that the law of Tennessee fully authorizes the city of MNemphis not only to issue
negotiable securities, but to make the guaranty in question. This
judgment is equally conclusive that in this State the non-performance of conditions by a corporation necessary to render its action
regular, will not affect parties who are not cognizant of the irregularity. On page 661, and onward, Zabriski v. R. .. Co., 21 How.
381, is approvingly cited as follows: "Corporations cannot by
their representations or silence involve others in onerous engagements, and then defeat the calculations and claims their own conduct had superinduced." This language is frequently used by
the U. S. Supreme Court. 24 How. 300; 3 Wall. 667, etc.
They also cite and approve Mercer County v. Hackett, 1 Wall. 93;
Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 548; Avery v. Alleghany
City, Id. 365; Van Horstrop v. Madison City, 1 Wall. 291.
Although the case before the court was that of a municipal corporation, the rule was applied that it was estopped from setting
up its own irregularities to defeat its apparently formal obligations with the same vigor as if it were a private company. All
the cases referred to in support of the doctrine, except Zabrisiv.
B. B. Co., are also those of municipal corporations. Towns,
counties and cities and railroad companies, are all, by the
judgments of this State, put upon the same footing.
That the city had power to make these contracts, including the
guaranty for the prompt payment of the work it ordered, to issue
the bonds, covenant for a sinking fund, and incur responsibility
for all ordinary damages for a violation of its contracts, we have
no doubt.

*

*

*

*

[The learned judge proceeds to argue the question of
the city's liability on its guaranty of the payment of the special assessments by the abutting lot owners, affirming such liability;
and the plea of release from all its obligations, in consideration of the
loan of its bonds to the contractors, denying such release for nonperformance by the city, as well as disputing the equity and consideration thereof; and discusses the liability of the city for failing
to secure its own bonds, and of the defendants for failure to return certain city bonds borrowed as follows:]
The questions which have given us m9st difficulty, and about
which, from the first, we have had most doubt, are-can any, and,
if so, what damages be given, against the city for its failure to
provide the sinking fund covenanted for in the second contract, and what shall be the measure of recovery for a failure to
return the $240,000 of borrowed bonds ? ' This covenant of guaranty was intended to give value to and went to the charactercf
*

*
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the thing it agreed to deliver in payment for the work performed
*
*
by the defendants.
*
*
*
*
*
The measure of damages for the conversion of the note or other
obligations of a private poeson, not intended for common circulation, and where there was no class of securities to which it belonged, which had by frequent sales acquired a market value, in
an action by the maker of an instrument, is the nominal amount
or par of the note or security. The same rule applies in an action against the debtor, when there is a failure on his part to deliver his own obligations. The only compensation, with rare exceptions, ever given by the common law for the non-payment of
money, or the non-delivery of the private securities of individuals
for money, is the maximum legal interest allowed by the lea loci
contractus.
That if the note of a private party be converted, its par value
is the criterion of recovery, Murray v. Barling, 10 Johns. 173;
Buck v. Kent, 3 Vt. 99; Decker v. Matthews, 12 N. Y. 313;
-Evans v. Kymer, 1 B. and Aid. 558, and Sedg. on Dam. and
many like judgments decide. There is no conflict in the decisions
or commentators. The reason given is, that however below its
par value .may be the security, as the subject of immediate sale to
Ithe wrong doer, its negotiation has in contemplation of law subjected the maker to liability for its whole amount. This rule,
counsel for the city say, in its proper extension sustains the position that the non-delivery of the kind of bonds described in the
contract cannot create a liability beyond the amount which the
contractors have subjected the city to pay, by the negotiation of
the bonds they have voluntarily received. If the bonds in this
case are to be likened to the notes of private person, this position
would manifestly conclude all claims of the contractors for the
*
*
damages allowed by the master.
*
*
[Here follows a statement of the rule that interest is, ordinarily,
-the sole measure of damages for the breach of a contract for the
payment of money, with a criticism upon its justice, and an analysis of the exceptions to such rule found in the cases in Marzetti
v. Williams, 1 B. & A. 423; Bollin v. Steward, 14 C. B. 495;
Boyd v. Fitt, 14 Irish C. L. 43, and an argument that this case
is within their reason and stronger in its circumstances. The
opinion then proceeds to another ground, on which the case is
placed as follows.]
This decision, however, is rested upon the assumption that the
subjects of the contract are in'all their features involved in the
question of damages, to be treated like chattels in Possession, and
the public securities of other corporations or States. The rule of
damages, therefore, in reference to chattels and the implications of
law restrting from their reception ind use, where a warranty has
been broken, will be applied in this case.
We shall give the two questions of damages for failure to provide the sinking fund and to return the borrowed bonds, no dis.
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tinct consideration. The same principles substantially govern
each.
The measure of damages for the conversion of goods, or of the
obligations of third persons, is their market value in all cases not
accompanied with special injury to the owner. For the non-delivery of goods or the obligations of third persons of thc kind
and value contracted for, it is the difference of the value of the
chattel or bond agreed to be delivered and that which is in fact
furnished. The following cases among many others sustain this
rule in its application to the non-delivery of the obligations of third
persons, including bonds, shares in corporations, bank bills, etc.:
Shelton v. French, 33 Conn., 489, a recovery was had of the difference in value between a bond with, and without a guaranty;
Coolidge v. Brigham, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 552; the difference in
value between a note with a genuine and a forged endorsement
was given. Not the face of the note, but its value as shown by
the evidence. And see Struthers v. 'Clark 30 Pa. St. 210;
Henneger v. Isabella Copper Co., 1 Cold. 241 ; Simpkins v. Low,
49 Barb. 382; Otter v. Brevoort P. Co., 50 Barb. 247; Endas
v. Board of Public Works, 1 Gratt. 364; Smith v. Dunlap, 12
Ill. 182; Baird v. Troliver; 6 Humphreys 186; Young v.
Givens, 6 Dana 1; Robinson v. Harley, 11 Iowa 410; C. & P.
Co. v. Kelly, 5, Ohio 180; Redfield on Wills, Part 2, p.
312.
That this is the rule in the case of the non-delivery of personal
property, books need not be cited. It is entirely clear.
Within this principle the contractors claim their own case comes.
If these bonds in the hands of the corporation which makes
them for public sale are to be treated for all purposes germane to
the contest here, like chattels or other things in esse, like the bonds
and securities of third persons, and other public securities; if they
cannot be upon principle, and are not in fact, by the courts
treated in any degree like the obligations of private individuals,
where" they refuse to deliver them according to contract, the same
rule of damages will apply as if chattels were the subject of the
agreement.
It is fully conceded by the counsel for the contractors that no
such rule could be applied, if the contract was for the delivery of
private notes of citizens in ordinary business between individuals.
After much consideration we think no distinction should be
made between the contract before the court, and one between the
same parties for the same work payable in the public bonds of
another corporation where there has been a refusal to deliver those
of the kind contracted for.
It is believed the adjudications already made in reference to the
nature of these bonds, go quite beyond the necessities of the
present case.
That these corporate securities, under seal, made payable to
bearer, and intended for sale in the public market, are negotiable
in as ample and full sense as the circulating medium of the coun-
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try, the following adjudications which decide it in manifold applications determine: White v. Vt. & Mass. B. B., 21 How.
575; Commissioners v. Aspinwall, Id. 545; Zabriskie v. B. B.
Co., 23 Id. 381 ; Woods v. Lawrence Co., 1 Black 386 ; Moran
v. Oommissioners, 2 Id. 722; Mercer Co. v. Racket, 1 Wall. 95;
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, Id. 175; Dunham v. B. B. Co., Id. 257;
Van Horstrop v. Madison City, Id. 291; Myer v. Muscatine
City, Id. 391; Curray v. Ladaer, 2 Id. 110; Thompson v. Lee
Co., 3 Id. 327; Bogers v. City of Burlington, Id. 654; B. R.
Co. v. Howard, 7 Id. 407 ; Campbell v. .Kenosha City, 5 Id. 197;
Morris Canal & B. Co. v. Lewis, 1 Beas. 329; Morris C. & B.
(o. v. Fisher,1 Stockt. 667; Mechanics' Bank v. . Y. & N. H..
B. B., 3 Kern. 599; Brainardv. N. Y. & N. H. B. B., 25 N. Y.
496; Delafield v. State of Ill., 8 Paige 527, and 2 Hill 159;
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. ( & C. B. B., 41 Barb. 9; Brown
v. Ward, 3 Duer 660; City of Bridgeport v. Housatonic B. B-,
15 Conn. 502; Bulkley v. Welch, 31 1d. 342; B. & H. B. B. v.
Hunt, 20 Ind. 467; Com'rs v. Bright, 18 Ind. 96; Junction.B.
B. v. Cleaney, 13 Id. 161; Maddox, et. al. councilmen v. Graham,
2 Mete. (Ky.) 79, ; Chapin v. Vt. & Mass. B. B., 8 Gray
575; Craig v. City of Vicksburg, 31 Miss. 216; De Foss v;
City of Bichmond, 18 Gratt. 338; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 488;
Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa 213; B'k of Ashland v. Jones, 16
Ohio St. 145; all these judgments assert the general rule by
which we'have preceded them. Many of thaem would go further
and decide that such bonds are to be deemed essentially chattels,
and things in esse, and not mere choses in action. This has been
done as often as exigencies required it.
No judgment conceding the negotiability, has denied the additional feature of their similitude to chattels. Pennsylvania alone
decides differently, confessing that this local rule is exceptional,
and at war with well settled law here and in England.
It would be usefil and very persuasive evidence of the conclusions at which we have arrived, to follow the numerous applications of this general principle through the cases which announce it.
The pressure upon the court and the absence ot all clerical assistance which forbids elaborate examination, render this impossible. A few instances only in illustration of how fully the court
have likened these.bonds to chattels, and how substantially they
have refused to apply the old rule of the common law, applicable
to the non-delivery of the evidences of indebtedness of individual
defendants, to bonds like these, can be referred to.
If the note or other chose in action of a private party is pledged
as security for a debt, the creditor, owing to the, nature of the
subject, takes only the power of collection, not that of selling it.
See Morris Canal Co. v. Fisher,1 Stock. 667; Morris Canal
Co. v. Lewis, 1 Beasley 323; Wheeler v. Newbold, 5 Duer 29; S.
C. on appeal, 16 N. Y. 392; Brown v. Ward, 3 Duer 660;
*Garlicv. James, 12 Johns. 146. The reason given is that such
securities have no market value like chattels, are not so dealt with
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in commerce, and that there is, therefore, no implied power of sale.
Where bonds of a corporation intended for general sale, like those
now in question, are thus pledged, this r'ule has been in vain invoked to invalidate their sale by the pledgee. That literally they
come within this rule is conceded. That they are choses in
action, evidences of indebtedness, it is said ; but of so different a
nature from those included in the principle relied on, that they
are to be treated like chattels, and must be subject to the sanze
ruleandpropertyincidents. In Wheeler v. Newbold, 5 Duer 29,
S. G. on appeal, 16 N. Y., in deciding that private notes could
not be sold, they go upon reasons necessarily involving the right
to do so, if they had the incidents of such securities as those before us. The case of Brown v. Ward 3 Duer 660, had been
tried, but not determined, when the preceding one was decided
in the Superior Court. In the latter, the public bonds of
a railroad company had been pledged and sold like personal property. The court sustaining the sale expressly distinguished the
case from Wheeler v. Newbold upon the ground that the subject
of the pledge was to be treated like things in esse, and not like
the private notes in that case.
In Morris Canal Co. v. Lewis, 1 Beasley 323, the company's
own bondf were pledged to secure its own debt, and sold at about
thirty cents on the dollar. The court says the -bonds in the
hands of the company making them were alike the subjects .of
pledge and sale as were personal chattels. They were not to be
treated like those of private persons. See, also, Morris Canal
Co. v. Fisher,1 Stockt. 667. There are Iother similar judgments
but the principle is undoubted. These have been particularly
noticed only to say, that every reason upon which this whole
class rests, shows that if the same defendant had three different
classes of bonds-ist, 2d and 3d-worth according to the priority
of their respective liens, 100, 75 and 50 cents upon the dollar, and
they should make a contract for work, or for the purchase of
engines and cars, agreeing to pay therefor in their first mortgage
bonds at par, and should deliver instead those of the third class
of one-half their value in the market, the company would be liable
in damages for the difference in value between what it agreed to
and what it did deliver. Freed from all questions of waiver, and
unembarrassed by the old notion that interest is the measure of
damages for the non-delivery of money, or a chose in action for
money, and treating the subject of the contract as what the courts
now affirm they are, chattels and things in esse, no plainer proposition can be stated than that the breach of the contract subjects the violator to substantial damages.
Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 21 Wis. 21'T; Mills v. Gleason, 11
Wis. 488; Cody v. Watertown, 18 Wis. 322, and other similar
cases, although not in their principle distinguished from White
W V. Co. v. Vallette, 21 How. and the large class to which it belongs, are in their facts so like the 'ase before the court as to entitle them to special mention. In the case in 21 Wis. the corporation
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contracted to pay for a public work in its bonds at par. City
officials without special resolutions agreed, if the contractors
would proceed, they should have the bonds much below par.
This modification wa3 sanctioned by the court of'last resort. It
overruled manifold objections to the general power of the corporation to make such an agreement, and if it had, to the authority
of its officials without formal corporate action to do so. A similar
transaction between citizens dealing with private notes would have
been illegal upon many common law and statutory grounds. Reposing, however, upon the peculiar character of these securities,
it was held the city might dispose of them at their market value.
The whole treatment of the case necessarily includes the propositions essential to give these contractors substantial damages,
where the corporation has contracted to deliver them one kind of
bonds, and has constrained them to accept another. The other
citations quite as forcibly, for our purpose here, apply the principle which holds these securities to be subjects of sale, and payment by the city at the common price.
It is well settled law, too, that when a citizen desires a loan of
money, and makes his private note for the purpose of raising it,
that no device of sale, pledge or 6ther collateral transfer can protect the ownerAhip of him who receives it, from the imputation of
usury if taken at a price less than that which will allow him lawful interest. May v. Camphell, 7 Humph. 450; Taylor v. Bruce,
G'Imer- (Va.) 42; 10 N. Y. 198; 9 B. Mon. 530 8 Cowen 689.
The judgments are very numerous to this point.
In circumstances identically like those where private paper has
been held void for usury, a like disposition of this class of bonds
has been held not to come within this rule. Municipal, railroad
and other public and quasi public corporations, have, in numerous
instances, where the sole object has been a loan published and
negotiated as such, and where no statute authorized a sale below
par, and where the question turned solely upon the essential and
substantial characterof the security sold, have disposed of their
bonds at rates giving the purchaser more than the lawful interest,
and it has been adjudged not to be usurious. The point has been in all these cases directly raised, and the
judgment always rested upon the answer to the question, are
they to be treated like chattels or like the choses in action of private persons ?
The answer has been that where a corporation mikes such securities for vendition in the market, they are to be treated as if it
offered for sale its personal property, or the 'notes and bonds of
other corporations.
In the Canal Co. v. Valette, 21 How. 414, mortgage bonds of
the corporation reciting that they were intended for a loan, were
paid at fifty cents on the dollar to a contractor. It was claimed
that the transaction was usurious, but the Supreme Court going
upon the nature of the securities and the transaction, held it to be
lawful. In Mforris C. & B. Co. v. Fisher, I Stockton 667, like

.
CITY OF MEMPHIS v. T. E. BRoW.K

bonds of the company to double the amount were pledged to secure a debt. In support of the plea of usury it was argued that
it was but the pledge of one promise to secure another, that the
legal consequences could not be different than if the whole transaction had been evinced by a single contract. It was quite conceded by the learned court that had it soibeen, or had the dealing been with the private paper of an individual in a like transaction, it would have been unlawful; nevertheless it was held that
these public securities in the hands of the corporation which makes
them, as well as in those of third persons, are to be treated like
other personal property, and the objection was not sustained.
In the Bank of Ashland v. Jones, 16 Ohio St. 145, bonds of a
railroad company having been guaranteed and sold at a price
under par, and suit brought upon the guaranty, among other objections urged was that of usury. In thelargument by which it
was overruled the court say the bonds in the hands of the original makers "are like chattels." The guaranty is substantially
treated like the warranty of personal property. And see the cases
of Curtis v. Leavette, 17 Barb. 311 ; S. 0. on appeal, 15 N. Y.
300; Leavette v. DeLany, 4 Comstock 364 7 Tracy v. Talmadge;
18 Barb. 456; S. 0. 14 N. Y. 162; Peofle v. Mead, 24 N. Y.
125. The argument and illustrations to be found in this whole
class of judgments leave nothing for the court by way of analogy
or extension of their principles, in order to decide that the delivery of a bond of less market value, and of materially a different
character from that agreed upon, subjects the corporation to damages. The case comes withinthe conceded truism that the measure of recovery for the breach of an express warranty in the sale
of personal chattels is the difference between the value of the
thing as warranted and its value as actually delivered. Numerous decisions, many of which are obligatory upon this court, de
termine principles which we think brings the subject of this contract within the rule. That in this case the city should respond
in damages in justice to the contractors, is apparent from the fact
that upon a resale of some of these bonds with like warranty,
these very defendants were held liable to this measure of damages,
Callan v. Brown & Co., 31 Iowa 333.
In the hurried examination we have been compelled to make,
we find but one case of the exact application we make of these
principles to the question of the liability of the contractors, for
the bonds loaned, though we can affirm with much confidence
there are others. In Tracy v. Talmadge, 18'Barb. 456 and S. 0.
14 2N. Y. 162, the State of Indiana sold its own bonds to a trust
company. The sale was held void for illegality, but the company
was held liable to the same measure of damages as if it had disp(,sed of the bonds without any contract. The court below decreed their payment at par. The Superior Court modified the
judgment in this respect, and held their market value to be the
true criterion. The case is one of the most elaborately argued
upon the question of illegality to be found in the books. That of
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damages was not fully discussed, but. from the character of the
counsel, its re-argument in the Court of Appeals and the modification
of the decree in that court upon this very point, it is very high
evidence of the law that where such securities are converted the
measure of recovery in a suit by the maker is their 'market value,
and not, as in the like case of the private note of an individual,
the sum which he may be ultimately compelled to pay. The different rules are naturally adapted to probable financial consequences of the act or omission complained of. The private citizen
has circulating no class of securities having a well-known price,
and which, in theory and in fact, he can, at any moment, purchase
at market standard. If his note is borrowed and not returned he
must pay its amount. If the bonds are converted or withheld
which have an established price at which they are in fact purchasable, no possible injury beyond it can result from withholding
them. Eventhe familiar rule regulating the right to damages, that
which stops at the limit of loss but gives all which the real loss
is, will sustain both branches of this portion -of our decree. They
will compensate for refusal to deliver the more valuable bond
greed upon by the city, and will restrain its recovery to the
,value in the market of what it loaned and what it can still purchase for the sum allowed by the master.

*

*

*

*

The acceptance and sale of the bonds was not a waiver of the
claim for. damages. The guaranty in this case is not technically
a warranty of the bonds. It is for the performance of a collateral
act affecting their Value. The legal and financial consequences,
however, are precisely the same as if the city had warranted the
bonds to be of a particular character. Their treatment, therefore,
has been and will be the same as if they were the special subjects of the guaranty.
We are referred to no decision giving any countenance to the
position that mere acceptance and use by the contractors is per se
a waiver of the breach of warranty on the part of the city.
Counsel have not relied upon them, but there are a few decisions,
holding that in action for the price of goods sold with a warranty,
the defendant could not show the breach if he had accepted the
property, and a few commentators, misapprehending them, have
erroneously supposed they rested upon the ground of waiver;
and that there could be no recovery in any form, for a breach of
warranty after a voluntary appropriation of the subject. Those
judgments, however, announce no such rule, but, on the contrary,
some of them expressly, and all impliedly, coiicede there may be
a cross actibn for the damages notwithstanding the acceptance
and use. The decisions say only, that under the general issue
in an action upon a contract, there could be no partial defense.
It is a mere question of pleading and form of action.
The general doctrine that the vendee of personal property with
warranty may maintain an action for the breach, notwithstanding
he has accepted and used it, is well established in this country
and especially in the Federal courts. Withers v. Green, 9 How
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213; Benjamin v. Hillard,23 How. 149; Lyon v. Bertram, 20
How. 150. Numerous similar cases are found in the Circuit
Courts. It is, however, by no means peculiar to the national
jurisprudence, for in its earlier history, there being some decisions
tending the other way, they adopted the rule we have announced,
because it was supported by so many State adjudications. Every
American treatise announces the rule which is applied in the following judgments. They decide and illustrate the principle that
waiver is a question of fact depending upon the circumstances of
each case, and that the law will not presume a waiver where it
is not clear that the parties intend one. Kellogg v. Denslow, 14
Conn. 411; Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y, 358; 1riller v. Eno, 14
N. Y. 598; Borrecins v. Beavan, 3 Rawle 23; Osgood v.
Lewis, 4 Har. & Gill 496; Hastings v. Lovering, 2 Pick. 214;
Field v. Kinnear, 4 Kansas 476; Babcock v. Price 18 Ill. 420;
Cooley v. Brigham, 1 Mete. 552; Fielder v. Starkey, 1 H. Bi.
17; Buchanan v. Pamshaw,2 Term 745; Hayworth v. Hutchin.
son, Law Rep 2. Q. B. 447 ; 1 Parsons' Contr. 591, (5th ed)
Benj. on Sales, 463, 522, 673, et seq. ; Sedg. on Dam. 319, (4th ed)
Within the rule of these cases, the acceptance and use of thes..
bonds must either have been sold or the work must have stoppe.
It is an irresistible inference from the proof that every city offiial
knew the rate at which they were being disposed of-one utterly
ruinous to the contractor if he was to have no remedy for -he
city's default. So far frem the circumstances -under which the
parties acted indicating an intention on the one part, or expectation on the other, of waiver, the presumiption is much stronger of
an understanding that they would be sold at a discount and the
loss made good.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
ELIZABETH GARVIN et al. v. JOHNY P. WILLIAMS, et al.'
Any transactions between a guardian and a ward recently arrived at age, by
which the guardian obtains an advantage or bounty, will be deemed primafacie
fraudulent, on account of the recent confidential relations of the parties, and
the burden of proof will be upon the beneficiary to show that the gift or arrangement was fair and conscientious.
Evidence in this case held not suilicient to support a verdict in favor of the
guardian.
In an issue to try the validity of a will, the beneficiaries under the will being
parties to the action, are competent witnesses in favor of the wilL They are
not within the exception in the statute which excludes the other parties where
one of the original parties to the contract or cause of action is dead.
1We give an exceptional amount of space to this case, as it was very elaboratelvarguedand considered, and we are not aware of any case in the'books in
hich the whole evidence is reported andheld insuflciteuto support the will.
lED. A1. R.
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This was a proceeding by appellants, the heirs at law, of
William David Petticrew, contesting the validity of his last will
and testament, whereby he devised an estate of the value of
seventy or eighty thousand dollars, to John P. Williams and
others. The trial resulted in a verdict for the will, and the contestants having thereupon moved for a new trial, and the same
having been overruled, they appealed on the three following
grounds, among others set forth in their motion.
lst.-Error in excluding the following italciised words from
the deposition of Eliza Garvin, of Virginia, a witness for plaintiffs-" My husband, Gilliland Garvin, and myself, lived with his
mother, Mrs. Elizabeth Garvin, from 1848 to 1852, when we returned to Virginia. Never saw William David but once, and
that was when I went with my husband to Mr. Williams' to see
him. Never heard any of the family speak unkindly of him.,
Have seen the old lady cry because she could not have the child
with her sometimes"-and in excluding the following italicised
words from the deposition of William Steele, another witness of
plaintiffs--" I visited the West and stopped atBrunswick in 1848.
While there I sought an introduction, and was introduced to Mr.
Williams by an acquaintance of mine. I inquired after my cousin,
William D. Petticrew, and Williams invited me to his house, as I
thought, in a cool, distant and formal manner, and I did not go."
2d.-There was no evidence tending to support the verdict.
8rd.-Error in granting the instructions asked for by defend.
ants.
The pleadings and evidence showed the following state of facts.
The testator was born in Keytesville, Chariton county, Missouri,
September 12th, 1839. In 1845 he lost his mother, and in February, 1847, also, his father, Doctor Petticrew, who devised him
the property in question, and appointed John P. Williams executor
and guardian. Williams and the Doctor had long been partners
with Harrison in the milling business, and it was in proof, that
when the Doctor made his will Williams had been sent for and
was present, and that the doctor, when asked by Williams what
he was to do with the boy and how he wished him educated, said
he desired Williams to raise him as he would his own child. At
the time the doctor had living with him, as his housekeeper, his
sister, Mrs. Garvin, whom, with. her. two children, Gilliland and
Bettie, he had brought out from Virginia, shortly after the death
of his wife. The other relations lived in Virginia or Tennessee,
and it was in proof that none had ever visited him, and that one,
of his cousins, named Steele; was at Brunswick in 1848 or 1849,
within six or eight miles of Williams' residence, for several weeks;
that he was twice invited, once by Mr. Williams and then by Mr.
Williams' brother-in-law to come out and see his -cousin, and did
not do so. It was also in evidence, that the doctor had by his
will given to his sister, Mrs. Garvin, a life-estate in a tract of lanU,
$50 to build her a house to live in, and a like estate in a negro
woman and her two infant children.
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The evidence further showed that the boy continued to live with
his aunt some two or three months after the doctor's death, when
Williams took him to his home, '1vhere he remained until Septem. her, 1857, at which date he sent him with his son Thomas to the
.college. at Fayette. That he attended there two sessions and more,
and was in the habit of going home and spending the holidays
and vacations. After quitting Fayette in the fall or early winter
of 1859, he attended commercial school in St. Louis, and went
thence to New Orleans on account of his health. At this latter
place be remained till toward summer of 1860, when he returned
to his home in Chariton. In February, 1859, he had the measles,
.which left him in a feeble state of health and with a cough.
After continuing at home during the summer and fall of 1860,
his guardian took him South about the first of December, and he
expired the same month, of consumption.
It was also in proof that he and his guardian had a settlement
on the 13th of September, 1860; that they appeared in the Probate
Court on that day, and the settlement was approved and entry
of satisfaction and release of the guardian and his securities by
the ward duly made. On this occasion, when Crawley turned
and asked Petticrew if the amount of the mill account was correct, he said it was right, -and he was satisfied and had confidence
in his "Uncle .John" that he would not do him injustice.
And on the next day, the 14th, he made !the will in question,
Harrison and Crawley being the witnesses.
Harrison testified that Williams, Doctor Petticrew and himself
had been partners in the milling business, and that after the
doctor's death. Williams and himself continued and were still in
the business. That at the request of Williams who wrote down
for him, he came up from Glasgow, and Williams, young Petticrew and himself made a settlement of the old mill accounts, embracing a period of four or five ybars, from 1843 to 1848, and amounting to some $40,000. This settlement they made at Williams'
house, and they had the mill-books there. They commenced
about the 10th of September, and when through, they all went to
Keytesville, Petticrew riding with Harrison in his buggy. On
reaching Ketesville, they went to Crawley and Elliott, who had
been several days engaged in making out for Williams and Petticrew a settlement of those matters in the Probate Court pertaining to the individual estate of Doctor Petticrew. Here the balances of the two settlements were added by Orawley, and the
notes and accounts and other property of the estate was turned
over to Petticrew, Williams giving, in addition, his note to Petticrew for a money balance of $12,500, and taking his receipt for
the same. As soon as this was done, they went, as before stated,
and finished the business in court. After the settlement they returned to Williams' house, and says Harrison, "I stayed in the
room with Petticrew that night. In the course of conversation
be observed he wanted to make a will, and as he didn't want the
thing known he was bothered about getting witnesses. I told
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him I thought I could fix it for him if he didn't want it knownthatI could be one andperhaps Mr. Crawley could be the other. Pre.
vious to this though, when going to Keytesville in the buggy,
he had observed to me that Mr. Williams' family appeared more
like relations to him than anybody else, and didn't wish any of
his blood kin to have any portion of his property whatever, and
stated his reasons for it. He said he had written several letters
to his relations in Virginia, and had sent them daguerreotypes and
they never had -written to him, or even so much as acknowledged
the receipt of them. And that while he was lying sick, one of
his cousins came out to Brunswick and was there several weeks,
and he sent him word to come and see him and he had not done
so. And that he did not intend any of his relations should have
any of his estate, not even a dollar. So next morning after the
night I had stayed with him, he requested me to tell Mr. Crawley.
to ride out and write his will. Accordingly I started with Mr. Williams to the upper-mill where we had business to settle with our
partner White. .and he turned off to the lower-mill to get the
upper-mill book, and I went on through Keytesville and told
Crawley and proceeded on to the upper-mill. Williams got there
about two o'clock in the evening, and'we -transacted the business
with White and then returned to Mr. Williams', reaching there a
little before night, or about dark I went around the hou-e, I think, to
tell the-boys to take the horses, and I didn't see and don't know
where Mtr. Williams went. I then went -inthe hous e, and in a
few minutes went up stairs on Crawley's coming down for me.
was necesWhen I got up there, Petticrew asked me whether it.
sary I should know the contents of the will. I told him nothat all that was necessary for me to know was that he signed it
for a purpose. I asked him no questions and I knew nothing of
its contents. After the will was sigued, and subscribed by Crawley and myself, he took it and put it away in his trunk. In the
following November I went up from Glasgow, carrying some New
York exchange which Mr. Williams had written for me to bring
him for the purpose of using it on the trip which he and Petticrew were about taking South, and the night before they started
I,stayed in the room with Petticrew, and he handed me his will
sealed up in a large envelope, with instructions to take care of it,
and I took it and deposited it in the bank at Glasgow, where it
remained until after Petticrew's death and burial. I neverknew
of the contents of the will till after the seal closing the envelope
containing it was broken by the clerk of theProbate Court, when
taken there for probate. I have no knowledge-that Mr. Williams
knew a lawyer was at his house the day the- will was made.
Nothing passed between him and me on the subject. I don't
know that he knew that Crawley was there that day. I don't
think he learned it from me. I tever mentioned the fact that Petticrew had made his will to any one, until after his death."
Crawley testified that on the 14th, about noon, Harrison came
into Keytesville and told him what Petticrew wanted-that he

GARVIN V. WILLIAMS.

accordingly rode out about two o'clock, the distance being about
two and a half miles, and on going into the parlor he saw Petticrewlying on the sofa, and there were present Mrs. Williams and
some one or two of Mr. Williams' daughters, and some lady visitors of the neighborhood. That after remaining a while in general conversation, Petticrew remarked that" thepapers he wished
me to see were up in his room, and upon his inviting me, we
went up together. On going into his room, he got pen, ink and
paper, and put them on the table which I drew in front of the
bed, and I took a seat at the table and he reclined on the bed.
Instead of a pen I used a pencil, and as Petticrew dictated I took
notes. lie set his own values on the slaves, and named the persons to whom he wished them to go, and also the amount to go
with them in order to make the bequest or gift of the amount desired. When he came to fr. Williams, he said, "I will give him
$10,000." and when I had gotten it down, he said, " No ! scratch
that out-I won't give him anything." Then after a pause, with
his head down, as if reflecting, he remarked that his "Uncle John"
had a second wife, and some of his children by her might get it,
and then he said, "I will give him $5,000 any way." After getting
through the memorandum, I then proceeded! to write out the will in
form, and during this be spoke of his kin, and said they didn't seem to
care anything about him, and he didn't mean to let any of them
have a cent of his property. He also spoke of the first Mrs. Williams as having been a mother to him, and her children as brothers and sisters, and of his having affection for them as such. Of
his own relations he knew none except his aunt, (Mrs. Garvin)
and family; that none had seemed to take any particular interest
in him, and* he had no affection for them, and he saw no reason
why he should have. He further said the conduct of his aunt's
family had been such as to disgrace him and his name, and that
of his father, and he didn't desire they should have any part of
his estate. He assigned as reasons for his bequests to Robert P.
Williams, of Fayette, and John Lewis, that they were favorites,
and he wanted to leave them something. He suggested giving
$5,000 to Bob Prewitt, to keep his kin from breaking his will, and
on my telling him the legatees would have interest enough in the
matter to see to that, he concluded not to put it in. When through
with the writing, he mentioned Harrison, and asked whether it
was necessary to let him know the contents of the will, and on
my telling him that it was not necessary, I then went down stairs
and brought Harrison up. The will had been read over before
this, either by Petticrew himself, or by me to him, and after iarrison came up we all signed it. I then put it in an envelope, and
handed it to Petticrew, and he laid it away in his trunk. When
the writing of the will was finished, or -hile it was going on,
Petticrew made me promise not to reveal or disclose its contents
to any one, and after Harrison came up to witness it, Petticrew
requested us not to mention the matter to any one. I have no
knowledge that he ever made any will besides this. This will
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wag not read to Harrison, nor did he read it. I never told any
one of the will, or that Petticrew had made a will, until after his
death and burial. He said nothing about his having said anything to any person about making a will. He dictated and originated the will in all its parts. He had no assistance or suggestions from any, so far as I know. There was no one present but
him and myself. The only time I saw Mr. Williams that day,
was in Reytesville in the morning. When we got through with
the will it was about dark. and I went down and out, and mounted my horse and rode home.
Sometime in the summer of 1858, Petticrew came into my
office at Keytesville, first talked of studying law, and then after
some remarks on this subject, said he desired to know enough law
to enable him to write a will. He then requested me to prepare
written directions, which I promised to do, and did. He went off,
and when he came back for -the directions, I apprehended he
might not be able to properly observe them; and I asked him
if he was not going to Fayette to school, and on his replying that
he was, I suggested to him to get Bob Prewitt or John F. Williams to write it for him.
Mrs. Garvin and her daughter (now Mrs. Krigbaum) resided
about a mile and a half from Keytesville. They led a secluded
life, only, as far as I know, going out to church. The daughter
neither visited nor was she visited. She was the reputed mother
of a bastard child, and her reputation suffered in that community,
as I suppose it would in any community. Mrs. Garvin's son
Gilliland did not live in Chariton after 1853. H.6r husband
was never in this country to my knowledge. Never saw any of
the relations of William D. Petticrew in the neighborhood of
Kcytesville, at any time, save those who lived there.
W. H. E., a witness for defendants, testified:
.William Petticrew and Thomas and Robert Williams and myself
grew up boys together. I often stayed all night with "Billy,"
and he often stayed with me. I went to school with him in
Chariton and in Fayette. He was always treated by Mr. Williams' family like the balance of the boys, and he always appeared
as one of the family. Mirs. Williams he addressed as "ma," Mr.
Williams as " U ncle John," and the girls as "sister." Never
knew or heard of any of his Virginia'or Tennessee relations comingto see him. He and I were very intimate, and were together
almost every Saturday, playing or hunting; have no recollection
of his ever visiting Mrs. Garvin; know Mrs. (arvin's daughter
when I see her, but don't know that I ever spoke to her. "Billy"
spoke to me a great many times in regard to'his family. One
time in particular, I remember, in the summer of 1860, the same
year that he died. I was then staying in Keytesville, and he
came into town, and I went home with him. On the way, he told
me that his mother's Bible had recently come into his possession
from some of his aunt's family, and that he considered it very
much of a disgrace that the names of Krigbaum's family (Krig-
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baum married Mrs. Garvin's daughter) were recorded in it with
his. Krigbaum's children's names, he said, were recorded on one
side of the leaf, and the marriages, births and deaths of his father's
family, were on the other side of the same leaf, and consequently
he could not tear out the Krigbaun record . lHe wanted, he said,
to tear out this record, but couldn't, he said, because it was on
the same leaf with the other record. He was a good deal angry
with that family, and swore a good many times, and said they
should never have a dn cent of what he had. His manner
was pretty positive, and made a strong impression on me.
In 1858 or 1859 it was, I think, I playfully mentioned Miss
M attie Williams to him, and suggested that I thought he had an
idea toward her, and that I was of the opinion it would suit him
first rate. lHe told me he never wanted me to speak of that again
-that he thought I had more sense-that what I had said mortified him-and that he felt if he should marry her it would be
like marrying his own sister.
I always understood from him that he regarded himself as one
of Mr. Williams' family, that he looked on the girls as his sisters,
and the old people as his parents; so far as I know, he always
looked upon Mr. Williams as a father. The conversation about
the Bible occurred in the summer of 1860, in August, after he
came from New Orleans. He spoke of the writing of Krigbaum
as a great crime, and as a disgrace. From the time he was seven
or eight years old he and I were constant companions. I was
with him pretty much wherever he went. I never went with
him to Mrs. Garvin's.
George Dewey, a witness for defendants, testified:
I knew Doctor Petticrew. Was one of his attending physicians,
and was present when he made his will, which was in February,
1847, about one week before he died. Mr. Williams was there.
lie had been sent for, I think, and got there before the making
of the will was concluded. The doctor made Mr. Williams the
executor of his estate and guardian of his son. Mr. Williams
asked the doctor what lie should do with him, and how lie wanted him educated; and the doctor told him he desired him "to
treat him as he would his own child." At the time the doctor
made Mfr. Williams executor and guardian Mrs. Garvin was living with the doctor. The boy remained with his aunt some two
or three months after the doctor's death, and then went to Mr.
Williams'. I often visited Mr. Williams' family after that, saw
the boy there, and should say lie was treated by the family as
"M
Mr. Williams' own child." In mind and will he was about that
of ordinary boys. He was neither a very sharp nor a very dull
boy.
I was his attending physician in 1860, after he cane up
from the South. The weather was warm, I know, and he was
sick and I attended on him. During the time I was attending
him, sometime in August, I think, I went over and had a talk
with him about his aunt Garvin. The way I came to talk with
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him about her was this: I heard from the negro woman I had at
my house, who heard through the other niggers, that "he wasn't
going to give his aunt Garvil anything." And when I next visited him at Mr. Williams', I broached the matter of the disposition
of his property, and suggested he should give his aunt the place
she lived on. He was then sick, and I was attending him. He
said "he wouldn't do it." He got into a passion and cursed
about it. All that he said I can't remember, but I remember he
swore he wouldn't give a d-n cent no how. Krigbaum, he said,
had written his childrens' names in the family Bible. Don't remember that he said anything about his feelings toward Mrs.
Garvin herself. No one was present during this conversation.
I advised the trip South which he took the following fall. Mrs.
Garvin wasn't of a very good disposition.
John A. Fugna, a witness for defendants, testified:
Knew Dr. Petticrew and Mrs. Petticrew. She died in April,
1845, soon afte*r which the son, then a small boy, went and staid
at Mr. Williams'. I was there frequently that summer, that is
the summer of 1845, and saw him every time I went. He seemed
to be treated as the other children were. During that time I
heard him address Mrs. Williams as "ma," Mr. Williams as "uncle," and the girls, that is, Miss Mary and Miss Mattie, as "sister."
James R. Horsely, a witness for defendants, testified:
After his mother's death, young Petticrew went and staid at
Mr. Williams' until his aunt Garvin came out from Virginia. During this period I visited there and saw the little fellow running
around with the boys, and he appeared to feel at home and at
ease, like the other children. He and Robert and Thomas Williams were about of an age, though they were a little larger. He
called Mr. Williams "Uncle John," and how he addressed the
other members of the family during that period I don't remember. After his father's death in 1847, he again went to Mr. Wlliams', and from that time on I visited the family, and I saw no
difference between Mr. Williams and him, and Mr. Williams and
his own boys. His intercourse with the family'seemed as free,
and as familiar as that of any member. He spoke of Mr. Williams as "Uncle John."
John Nickerson, a witness for defendants, testified:
I lived on Mr. Williams' farm from 1846 to 1849. Mr. Williams' family treated young Petticrew about as they did the other
children. He was frequently at my house. He had a great dislike to his aunt. He told me so. He said his aunt had whipped
him severely, and he didn't like to be about her. He told me this
the same evening or the morning after he came tc Mr. Williams'
to live. I know Mr. Williams once took him in his buggy, and
left him at his aunt's in Keytesville, and on our return in the
evening he took him home. I know he went to his aunt's at
other times. I recollect hearing Mr. Williams tell him he ought
to go and see his aunt, but don't knowthat he made a reply. The
time that I heard Mr. Williams endeavor to induce him to go,
VoL XX.--42
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was in the fall of 1847, when he took him along with us in the
buggy. He called the young ladies "sister," and Mrs. Williams
"ma." Mr. Williams and Doctor Petticrew were very intimate.
W. H. Porter, a witness for defendants, testified:
I knew Petticrew as a little boy. He came to school to me in
1847, and then again in 1856. His capacity was about that of
other boys-an average. He appeared to take care of himself
and hold his own with the other scholars. In 1856 I approached
him on the subject of doing something for his aunt and cousin, of
helping them, and asked him if he would not. I suggested $1,500.
At this he seemed to fire up and be provoked. Finally I suggested $500, and he said he didn't intend to do anything for them.
His mind, he said, was fully made up on the subject, and he didn't
intend to have anything to do with them. He spoke of his aunt
treating him a little rough and harshly, and about Bettie and
what had happened to her, and said he had no intercourse with
them and they had sought none with him. I told him I expected
his aunt had done nothing more than to try to make a good boy
of him, and he seemed provoked at me a little that I should even
suggest such a thing. I noticed on that occasion that he seemed
to be a boy pretty much of his own will.
A. C. Dyas, a witness for defendants, testified:
I was adjunct professor in the Mathematical Department of
Central College at Fayette, from the fall of 1858 till the close of
the session in June, 1859. Petticrew was a student there part of
that time. When he applied himself he got along very well.
His capacity to acquire was what might be termed ordinary. I
have no distinct recollection of his course after the Christmas
holidays. He went to Chariton and returned, and shortly after
had the measles, and was sick for some time. In the early part
of the winter he boarded at Prewitt's, and continued there, I believe, until after he had the measles, when he went and boarded
at Mr. Lewis'. He didn't give his whole time to study. I think,
and thought at the time, that he had rather positive opinions of
his own about everything. He was rather determined in anything he undertook. He had a cane, I remember, which I proposed to buy of him at cost, and he agreed I should have it, provided he could get another. I wanted him to let me have it then,
but under no circumstainces would he consent until he could ascertain whether he could procure one like it. The opinion I formed of him was, that he had capacity, but did not apply himself.
After he had the measles, his health was decidedly feeble.
Charles V. Mead, a witness for defendants, testified:
Petticrew and myself were classmates at the Central College.
We both entered there in September, 1857. After he came to
Prewitt's to board, in February, 1858, we roomed, ate, slept and
studied together. He stood about average in his classes. His
constitution was delicate. In character liewas independent, and
in conduct quite so. He was rather inclined to take his own notions. His utterances were generally decided, and when he laid
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down his ultimatum he seldom yielded. Among the students I knew
none firmer than he in maintaining an opinion when he had once
assumed it. When he came to Prewitt's to board, Thomas Williams came with him and boarded with us. The last time I saw
him was in November, 1859, and there was no change in his
I
mental capacity or vigor.
John F. Williams, a witness for the defendants, testified:
I am a lawyer; Col. Frank Williams is my father, and Mrs.
John P. Williams is my aunt. I lived at Fayette and practised
law there, and in Chariton. I knew Wm.D. Petticrew from the
time the went to Mr. John P. Williams' to live. I was often
there, and saw no difference in the manner of treatment between
him and the other children of the family. All were raised up
alike. His capacity I regarded as average ; an average of the educated boys or young men of his age. He .was rather obstinate
than otherwise, had his own opinions, and was more stern and
unyielding than most young men. In 1857 and 1858 I was with
him a great deal. He boarded at my father's some'ten months,
and I spent my evenings there. He also boarded at my sister's,
Mrs. Prewitt's, and afterward with Mrs. Lewis, a cousin of mine.
My brother, Robert P. Williams, and he were of about the same
age. Never knew him to be sick until after he had the measles.
While boarding at Lewis' his health was delicate, and he told me
Mr. and Mrs. Lewis were very kind and attentive to him. He
always liked them. I knew Neal. Petticrew borrowed of me $300
to'pay, as he said Neal's board. This was in ]858. I remonstrated with him about his doing so, then loaned him the money
which he afterward repaid. He always seemed to like me very
much, and associated with me very well considering the differences in our ages, and I always regarded him and Tom Lewis as
one of the family. He always treated my uncle John P. Williams and his wife as a boy would treat his father and mother,
and their children, as brothers and sisters; and he seemed to regard them as such. In the spring of 1859, after he had the
measles, he went up to Charitom and returned. -And about the
close of the session in June, he came to my office and told me he
wanted me to write his will. I looked up and laughed, and fold
him he was not old enough.
He replied he was over eighteen, and old enough to will his
personal property. I told him certainly he was old enough for
that, and then he proceeded to state the dispositions or bequests
he desired to make. He made bequests to Neal, to John Lewis
(one of the devisees here), to my brother, Robert P. Williams,
(also a devisee here), and to myself. The bequests to us all were
the same in amount, either $2,500 or $3,000 to each, which sum
I cannot now remember. He also gave to each of the five children of John P. Williams a similar amount, and the overplus he _
gave to his "Uncle John," as he called Mr. John P. Williams.
He said he didn't care particularly about giving his "Uncle
John" anything, only he had managed the estate long and well,
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and he thought it likely there was money loaned out he would
never be able to collect back, the notes not being good, and he
preferred giving him something, and would therefore give him the
overplus to cover what he considered as losses. During the conversation I asked him how much,personal estate he had. He told
me. I asked him how he knew, and he said he had examined the
statements made by his "Uncle John " and knew about what it
was. He had examined "the paper," he said, and knew about
what personal property and money there was. He valued the
slaves himself. The portions he gave to Neal, Lewis, my brother
and myself were in money, and those given to the children of
John P. Williams were in slaves and money. This was about the
last of June, 1859, and just before the school session closed. He
requested me not to mention the fact that he had made a will at
all, and to get parties to attest it that "would say nothing about
it." I got A. J. Cooper and Charles Stewart, neither of whomii
read the will, nor was it read to them or in their hearing. The
reason of this was Petticrew didn't want anybody to know its
contents. I handed the will to Petticrew and never saw it again.
While drawing up this will, I mentioned his aunt, and suggested
he "ought to give her something." He said his father had made
provision for her during her life-time, and that as to her daughter
he did not wish she should inherit anything of his estate. He
further said his aunt didn't need anything, and if he died before
twenty-one, his real estate went to them anyhow. He also spoke
of his relations in Virginia and Tennessee, said he didn't know
them, and as far as he knew they cared nothing for him, and he
had not a relation on earth he would let have any of his estate if
he could help it.
I did not marry until December, 1859. My wife is a niece to
John P. Williams, and visited his family, and Petticrew knew her
and disliked her. He knew I was waiting on her, and when I
went up to Jackson county in the summer of 1859 with him, he
told me if I married her he wouldn't leave me anything in his will
"nd
a" he didn't either." I married her in St. Charles, and he
came up from St. Louis and was present at the wedding, and I
saw nothing more of him till August, 1860. At this last date
his mind was as it always had been, but he was physically weaker. After the spell of measles, in February, 1859, a change took
place in his health, and every time I saw him he was subject to
a cough.
Robert T. Prewitt, a witness for defendants, testified:
Am a lawyer, and attended tMe Chariton court twice a year,
and usually staid at Mr. Williams' one night, sometimes two
nights in each term. Knew Petticrew there, and knew him intimately after he came to Fayette. Ile came with Tommy Wi,liams, son of John P. Williams, and they boarded first with Col.
Frank Williams, then they boarded with me about a year, aftoi
which they went and boarded with Mr. Lewis. Before leaving
my house, he told me "Sue" (so he called Mrs. Lewis) and Mir
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Lewis had consented to take them, and he seemed to consider they
had done him a favor. Re spoke of it several times afterward to
me, and said they had been very kind to him. The feeling he
manifested toward them from the time they received him into
their family was that of the utmost friendship and kindness. He
felt himself under obligations to them for taking him there to board.
He said Mr. Lewis had declined to take boarders, but had taken
him as a favor. My wife is a niece of Mrs. John P. Williams
and sister to Robert P. Williams, one of the devisees in this will,
and cousin to Mrs. Lewis, the wife of John Lewis, who is another
devisee in this will. Petticrew associated with Robert P. Williams at Col. Frank Williams', and seemed particularly fond of
him. They were of about the same age, Petticrew being a little
the younger, and they were very friendly and intimate.
After the close of the school in 1859, I rode up home with Petticrew to Chariton. It was in the sumnier. We had a conversation, but how it came up I do not remember. He was "anxious,"
he said, "to live till he was twenty-one." I told him I hoped be
would live long beyond that, and asked why he was so anxious.
He said he wanted to live to make his will, that his kin cared
nothing for him and he didn't intend any of them should have a
cent of his property. To this that he said about his kins-people,
I said nothing in reply.
Johr W. Henry, a witness for defendants, testified:
I am a .lawyer, and was frequently at Mr. John P.-Williams'
between the years 1848 and 1857; saw Petticrew there with the
other children, and saw no difference, not a particle, in'the treatment they received. He and John F. Williams were up on a
visit at my house in Jackson county in the summer of 1859.
While there I had a conversation with him in my office about
business. He was then within a year of his majority, or thereabouts, and we talked about the pursuits best for young men to
engage in. The conversation run generally on banking, law and
mercantile business. Finally, he said his principal anxiety Was
not so much to determine what pursuit he would -engage in, as to
make a will. I asked him why he was so anxious about that,
and he said if he died without a will his relations in Virgihia,
Tennessee and Missouri would get his property, and he didn't
wish them to have it. I knew he had-an aunt (Mrs. Garvin) in
Chariton, and asked him why he didn't want her to have something, and he said his father had made provision for her, but
what it was he did not say, nor did I ask. Ie said his father
had provided for her, and that*her daughter had disgraced his
family, and he was determined none of her familI should have
any of his estate. I saw him afterward, in the spring of 1860, in
New Orleans, and we had a conversation there in which he said
about the same in substance that he did in my office in Jackson
county. My wife is a sister to John F. Williams and niece to Mrs.
John P. Williams.
W. H. Hardy, a witness for defendants, testified:
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I knew Mr. Petticrew in St. Louis, in December 1859, when be
was attending commercial college. Next saw him in New Orleans, about the 10th or 15th of January, 1860, and thence almost
every day till he returned to Missouri. Thomas Williams was
with him there, and in St Louis also. When in Ncw Orleans,
}'etticrew staid with me as often as two or three nights in a week,
and we conversed a good deal together. In the latter part of the
winter or early spring of 1860 he expressed a wish to live. His
health was then delicate. .1 asked him why he should be so solicitous, and he said he wanted to make his will. I said to him:
"If you are going to die so soon, what difference is it whether you
make a will or not ?" and he said he wanted to give his property
to his friends, and wanted to live till he was twenty-one, so he
could do this. When in St. Louis I heard him speak of going to
Orleans, and the person be was going with he spoke of or called
aunt or cousin.
W. C. Driver, a witness for defendants, testified:
I live in New Orleans, and was engaged in the house of Goodrich & Co., in which Mr. Abbott was concerned. I saw and knew
William D. Petticrew there in 1859 and in 1860, that is, two seasons. I was not intimate with him, but I knew him very well.
I saw him twice in the latter part of 1860. I sat up with him
twice, those being the times I saw him. I sat up with him the
night before he died. He knew his end was approaching, for he
told me so himself, and he told me he had made his will, and as
far as it was possible for him to do, he had rewarded those who
were kind to him, and Mr. Williams' (" Uncle John," he called
him), and Mr. Abbott's family were not aware of the fact. No
one else was in the room when he told me this except his servant,
who was lying on the floor. He said Mr. Williams and Mr. Abbott were the best and only friends he had, the only ones who
had shown him kindness. I don't know who came with him to
New Orleans. On neither night that I was there was Mr. Williams there. He may have been, but I haven't the remotest idea
that be was. Mr. Abbott was not there when he told me this,
Don't know who took his remains to Missouri. He said Mr.
Williams had raised him. He didn't say what Mr. Abbott had
done; it wasn't necessary.
Fanny Montague, a witness whose deposition was taken by defendants, and read by plaintiffs, testified:
I have been very intimate with the family of Mr. Williams;
spent much of my time with them-as much as six weeks at one
time, while William Petticrew lived wit4 them. From the manner in which they treated him I should not have known that he
was not an own child of Mr. Williams'. He always addressed
Mr. Williams' two oldest daughters as "sister" and Mrs. Williams as "mother."
The affection he manifested for the family
seemed fully equal to that manifested among themselves for each
other. I have frequently seen him throw his arms around Mrs.
Williams' neck and embrace her in the fondest manner, and she
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treated him with the same affection she did her own children.
Never heard any of the family in the presence of William say
anything to the disparagement of his aunt, Mrs. Garvin. Heard
Miss Lizzie ask him, when he had been to town, and his aunt
lived there, if he had been to see her, and heard her urge him to
go and manifest a proper respect for her. I never knew his aunt
to visit him. Never saw her in my life. Mr. Williams always
treated him like his own children. Never knew Mr. Williams to
act tyrannically or in an overbearing manner toward him. He
treated and governed William as he did his own children, more
by the force of love than anything else. He had as good capacity for understanding and taking care of his own interest as most
boys. This trait I remarked particularly. After the disease had
taken hold of him, and before he was confined to his-bed, the family manifested a great deal of anxiety and solicitude toward him.
[We omit, as unnecessary, the evidence' on the part of the plaintiffs, and likewise the instructions given at their instance.]
The instructions given for defendants were as follows:
1. The court instructs the jury that Win. D. Petticrew had the
right by -law, when twenty-one years of age, to devise and bequeath his property of all kinds to the persons mentioned in the
will, or to just such persons as he chose; and if the jury find
from the evidence that the will in question was made by said
Petticrew from his own free, independent volition and choice, and
that the making thereof was not contrived or brought about by
the legatees or either of them, then the jury shall find for the
defendants.
2. Although the law will presume that a will made by Win.
D. Petticrew, during the existence of the guardianship of John
P. Williams, or shortly after its termination, by which Williams
was to be benefited, was procured to be made by the undue influence
of John P. Williams, 'yet that presumption may be rebutted bytestimony showing that the will was the result of other impulses and
feelings; and if Petticrew was induced to make the will by the
kind treatment which he received from John P. -Williams and his
family, and that such kind treatment sprang from generous and
disinterested motives on their part, and that iAimaking said will
he acted from his own free, 'independent volition and choice, they
must find the issue for the defendant$.
3. If the jury believe from the evidence that Wm. D. Petticrew received kind treatment from John P. Williams and his
family---that such treatm nt sprang from gendrous and disinterested motives on their part, then such kind treatment affords no
presumption of undue influence exerted over or-upon said Petticrew, and does not impair the validity of the will in question.
4. The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the
evidence that John P. Williams, and his family, for years before
the will was made, treated Wm. D. Petticrew with kindness andaffection, and such kindness and affetionate treatment sprang
from generous and disinterested motives, and did not result from
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selfish or sinister purposes, and the will in question resulted from
such kindness and affection, and was made by said Petticrew of
his own free, independent volition and choice, then the jury should
find in favor of such will.
5. The statements of William D. Petticrew, as to what John
P. Williams or any of the legatees in the Will said in relation to
Mrs. Garvin or any of her family, are not competent to prove
that John P. Williams or any of the legatees made any such
statements.
Glover & Shepley, Harris;and Crews, Letcher & Laurie for
appellants.
Sharp & Broadhead,Knox, Shackelford, and Wingate, for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WAGNER, C. J.-The instructions given by the court on the trial
ofthis cause were unexceptionable, provided there was evidence sufficientto justify them. When this cause was here before we held that a
transaction like the will in question, between a guardian and a ward,
could not stand if the period between the miking of the will and
the coming of age of the ward was short, unless the circumstances showed in the most satisfactory manner, and beyond a reasonable doubt, the most entire good faith on the part of the guardian.
Garvin v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465. When a ward has but recently
arrived at age, any acts of his conferring an advantage or bounty
upon'his late guardian excite the strongest suspicions and are
viewed by the courts with an almost invincible jealousy. They
are considered as constructively fraudulent on account of the confidential relations existing between the parties. They are withdrawn from the operation of the ordinary rules of evidence, and
the burden is devolved on the beneficiary of showing that the gift
or arrangement was fair and conscientious and beyond the reach
of suspicion. A rule of public policy and pure morals lies at the
foundation of this principle and demands its'stringent enforcement.
Any one occupying a fiduciary relation so recently that the influence is presumed to still exist cannot avail himself of a bounty
from his late ward, or other person holding the relation, unless
there is clear and distinct evidence that the influence has determined, and that the donor acted perfectly free, independent and
unbiased. And the beneficiary must in all instances furnish this
evidence. That it is not easily attainable, I am aware, and therefore learned judges have said that it was almost impossible to
make this proof. I have in vain searched this record to find any
evidence introduced by the defendants, the beneficiaries in the
will, to overthrow and repel the presumptions which the law raised that the will was procured and made while the testator was
under the immediate influence of those who were to be benefited
by it. Without that evidence the will cannot stand. It is not a
question of the weight or evidence with which we would not in-
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terfere, but it is a case of an entire want of evidence.. The instructions, therefore, given for the defendants, while good enough
as abstract propo§itions of law, were erroneous because there was
no evidence to support them.
This.must lead to a reversal of the case. But there is a question presented by the record in respect to the action of the court
in rejecting certain evidence offered by the defendants.
On the trial some of the beneficiaries under the will, and who
were parties to the suit, were introduced as witnesses, but they
were objected to, and the court ruled that they were incompetent.
Exceptions were duly taken.
For the appellant, it is insisted that the court committed no error in holding that the witnesses were incompetent to testify, and
the argument is based on that section of the statute which allows
paities to give evidence, but provides "that in actions where one
of the original parties to the contract or cause of action in issue
and on trial is dead or shown to be insane, the other pdrty shall
r.ot be admitted to testify in his own favor." This question has
never been raised before in this court, under the statute. In the
crse of Tingley et al. v. Cowgill et al. 48 Mo. 29, all the parties
to the record, both the contestants to the will and those who took
under it were admitted to testify, and the point was not even
mnde or alluded to. The cases cited to sustain the ruling of the
court are adjudications where either the estate of the deceased
person was a party, or where the contest arose out of some contract or agreement with the deceased in his life-time, and in which
his rssignee or representative was a party.
But proceedings in reference to the establishment oi invalidity
of a will stand on a different foundation from ordinary actions at
law or causes of actions. They are in the nature of a proceeding
in rem, and simply amount to a revival of the same matter in the
Circuit Court which has been previously had in the county court.
The same legal rules that govern the investigation in the county
court apply in the Circuit Court. The heirs at law and devisees
are made nominal parties, but in truth the proceeding is ex parte,
and all are competent witnesses. See Dickey v. .Malichi,6 Mo.
The section in our statute now under consideration is a precise
and literal copy of the statute of Massachusetts, and in that State
the question has been directly passed on, and received a definite
construction. The case arose upon contesting the will of Miss
Burnstead. Shaler and Hayden were devisees under the will, and
also executors, and it was alleged that they procured the will to
be made by undue influence and fraud. Upon the trial they were
permitted to give testimony in their own behalf. This was assigned for error. The Supreme Court, in reviewing the question,
say: It was further objected that Hayden and Shaler were not
competent witnesses under the statute, but this is not a casewhere one of the original parties to the contract, or cause of action
in issue, and on trial, is dead.

